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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:
This is an appeal from the District Court's decision relative to the Amended
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief in which the Appellant sought a
declaration as to the parties' respective rights, status, and other legal relations relating to
Appellant's ability to legally reside at his real property, free of interference from the
parties.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:
The Appellant filed a Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief on January
16, 2018. (R. p. 15-19) The Defendant, Challis Joint School District No. 181 filed an
Answer on March 30, 2018. (R. p. 20-25) Following negotiations, Challis Joint School
District No. 181, filed an Order Dismissing with Prejudice Defendant Challis Joint
School District No. 181, in which they agreed to comply with any Orders or rulings of the
District Court. (R. p. 26-28) Respondent filed an Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint for
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief on July 18, 2018. (R. p. 29-30) The Appellant filed an
Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief on December 14, 2018, which
included the Idaho Attorney General as a party. (R. p. 31-35) Respondent filed an Answer
to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Defendant Lumpkin' s Cross-Claim, which
asserted a claim against the Idaho Attorney General, on January 15, 2019. (R. p. 36-41)
An Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, which dismissed the Idaho Attorney General from
the proceeding, was filed on March 25, 2019. (R. p. 46-47) A Court Trial was conducted
on April 17, 2019, with the Appellant and the Respondent as the only parties to said trial.
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(Tr. See generally) Judgment was entered on April 24, 2019. (R. p. 48-49) The Appellant
filed his Notice of Appeal timely on June 4, 2019. (R. p. 50-52) An Order Conditionally
Dismissing Appeal was filed on June 13, 2019, (R. p. 56-60), with an Amended Judgment
and Amended Notice of Appeal being filed July 3, 2019 (R. p. 65-66, 61-63), and an
Order Withdrawing Conditional Dismissal filed July 9, 2019. (R. p. 64) In addition,
Respondent filed a Motion to Reconsider relative to reconsideration of the Court's denial
of an award of attorney's fees and costs, which was denied by a Decision and Order Re:
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration dated July 22, 2019. (R. p. 67-73)

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Appellant (hereinafter "Lingnaw") is a registered sex offender. Lingnaw moved
from Twin Falls, Idaho, to Challis, Idaho, some time around April, 2017. While residing
in Twin Falls, Lingnaw's sex offender registration was supervised by Doug Sugden
(hereinafter "Sugden").
Prior to moving to Challis, Lingnaw was required to disclose where he was
moving to. (Tr. p. 7) Lingnaw had purchased real property located at 201 South 6th Street,
Challis, Idaho, around March or April, 2017. Both Lingaw and his wife's name are on
the Deed. Before purchasing the property, Lingnaw went to Sugden's office to make
certain that he would legally be able to reside there. Lingnaw was informed by Sugden
that he had done some research and the property was okay. (Tr. p. 8-9) Lingnaw testified
that at the time he purchased the home, he believed that the building was being used by
the County Commissioners. Based upon Lingnaw's discussions with Sugden and his own
investigation, neither Lingnaw or Sugden were concerned about the location. (Tr. p. 10)
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At the time of trial, Lingnaw testified that it was his understanding that the school
owned the property, however, the building was being leased by the BLM. Lingnaw
further testified that the last time the building had been used as a school was his
stepdaughter’s class of 2004. (Tr. p. 12) Lingnaw testified that the building did not have
any posted notices as required by Idaho Code Section 18-8329. (Tr. p. 13) Lingnaw
testified that his house was about one block down the road from the school owned
property line.
Lingnaw conceded that from the outside of his home to the school owned property
line is less than 500 feet. He testified that the distance from his home and the gym
exceeds 500 feet. (Tr. p. 18) Lingnaw testified that he agreed that the building was
owned by the school, but disputed whether it meets the definition of “school”. (Tr. p. 33)
Lingnaw testified that on the front of the building at issue the sign says Bureau of Land
Management. (Tr. p. 40) He also testified that one of the baseball fields behind the
building was replaced by a parking lot. He stated that he did not believe the building to be
a school because it is not a place where children are picked up, to and from, at certain
times. (Tr. p. 47) Lingnaw further testified that he had an opportunity to drive by the
building at issue during the morning and afternoon hours, and had never seen school
buses pull up to this building nor children embark into the school and then disembark out
of the school. (Tr. p. 78) Lingnaw testified that while one of the exhibits reflected a
basketball court, it had been fenced in as a BLM parking lot prior to trial. (Tr. p. 81)
Lingnaw further acknowledged that although his residence is within 500 feet of the
school’s property line, he was not residing within 500 feet of the property on which a
-3-

school is located. (Tr. p. 83)
Lani Rembelski (hereinafter “Rembelski”), who is the Superintendent of the
Challis School District and the elementary principal testified at the trial. (Tr. p. 88) She
testified that the building at issue with the BLM sign on the front of it is owned by the
school. She testified that between the courthouse and the BLM building there is a gym.
(Tr. p. 91) Rembelski testified that the BLM is leasing some of the building from the
school district. (Tr. p. 92) She also testified that there was another tenant in that building,
InterMountain Family Services. She went on to testify that there is a junior/senior high
school in which the junior component consists of 7th and 8th grade and the senior
component consists of 9th to 12th grade. She testified that the elementary school consists
of grades Pre-K through 6th. (Tr. p. 93)
Rembelski testified that the junior/senior high school was approximately 100-200
yards away from the elementary. In addition to the elementary school and the
junior/senior high school, Rembelski referred to the BLM building as a middle school,
however, conceded that no grades currently attended that building. (Tr. p. 94) She
admitted that while the BLM building may have functioned as a middle school in the
past, that at the time of trial, it was not functioning as a middle school. She further
testified that there was no academic instruction occurring at that building and that there
were no children dropped off in the morning at said building. (Tr. p. 95) Rembelski
testified that in the BLM building there is an auditorium that is used intermittently. (Tr.
p. 96) She testified that the auditorium was used by the school district on average once
per month. (Tr. p. 97) Rembelski further admitted that the term “middle school” is no
-4-

longer utilized by the school system in Challis. (Tr. p. 99) She clarified that while there
had been two baseball fields behind the BLM building, one of the baseball fields was
removed and converted into the BLM yard. She further stated that there were no school
sponsored events occurring on that remaining field. Rembelski made it clear that the only
portion of the property that housed school sanctioned events was the gym or the
auditorium. (Tr. p. 100) She set forth that the last time the BLM building had been
utilized as a traditional school with academic instruction was the 2002-2003 school year.
It was then utilized as an alternative school between 2008-2010, and had not been utilized
as a traditional school for some nine (9) years as of the date of trial. (Tr. p. 103)
Rembelski stated that the auditorium is not used during school hours and that the gym is
usually used after school hours. (Tr. p. 119)
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
(A) Whether or not there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
findings of fact;
(B) Whether or not the findings of fact support the conclusions of law;
(C) Whether or not the Court abused its discretion/erred in denying Appellant the
opportunity to present closing argument; and
(D) Whether or not the Appellant is entitled to an award of costs, pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 10-1210, and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121.
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ARGUMENT
It is important to note that in cases involving declaratory relief, Idaho Code
Section 10-1209 sets forth as follows:
When a proceeding under this act involves the determination of an issue of fact,
such issue may be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of fact are
tried and determined in other actions at law or suits in equity in the court in which
the proceeding is pending.
Lingnaw asserts that the District Court's findings are not supported by substantial
and competent evidence. As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, the testimony at
trial makes it clear that the building at issue in the instant case, while owned by the school
district, is not utilized as a traditional school, i.e., there is no academic instruction
occurring at that building and that there were no children dropped off in the morning at
said building. (Tr. p. 95) In fact, the last time the BLM building had been utilized as a
traditional school with academic instruction was the 2002-2003 school year. It was then
utilized as an alternative school between 2008-2010, and had not been utilized as a
traditional school for some nine (9) years as of the date of trial. (Tr. p. 103) The
auditorium is not used during school hours and the gym is usually used after school
hours. (Tr. p. 119)
As set forth in Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317 (2013):
When this Court reviews a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
after a bench trial, the review is "limited to ascertaining whether the evidence
supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the
conclusions oflaw." Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 77, 205 P.3d 1209,
1213 (2009) (citing Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488-89, 129 P.3d
1235, 1237-38 (2006)). Because "it is the province of the trial court to weigh
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses,"
this Court liberally construes the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the
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judgment. Id. (citing Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942
(1999)). “This Court will not set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless the
findings are clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143
Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006); I.R.C.P. 52(a)). Therefore, if the trial court's
findings are based upon “substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting,”
those findings will not be overturned on appeal. Id. (citing Benninger, 142 Idaho
at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238). Nor will this Court substitute its view of the facts for
that of the trial court. Id. (citing Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 4). “This
Court exercises free review over matters of law.” Id. (citing Bolger v. Lance, 137
Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002)).
Id. at 322.
The term “substantial evidence” is further discussed in the case of City of
Middleton v. Coleman Homes, LLC, 163 Idaho 716 (2018) as follows:
This Court will not set aside a trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are
clearly erroneous.” Mortensen v. Berian, 163 Idaho 47, 50, 408 P.3d 45, 48 (2017)
(quoting Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 77, 205 P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009) ).
“Clear error will not be deemed to exist if the findings are supported by
substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence.” Id. (quoting Pandrea v.
Barrett, 160 Idaho 165, 171, 369 P.3d 943, 949 (2016) ). Evidence is substantial
and competent if a reasonable trier of fact could accept and rely upon the evidence
in making a factual finding. Id. (citing Greenfield v. Wurmlinger, 158 Idaho 591,
598, 349 P.3d 1182, 1189 (2015) ).
Id. at 727.
Lingnaw asserts that the Court’s findings are clearly erroneous based upon the
testimony elicited at trial. In addition, Lingnaw asserts that the Court erred in concluding
that the BLM building qualifies as a “school” as that term is utilized in Idaho Code
Section 18-8329.
This err centers around the interpretation of Idaho Code Section 18-8329, and
more specifically, the definition of the word “school” as that term is utilized in said
statute. Idaho Code Section 18-8303 entitled “Definitions”, does not define the word
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“school”. As such, it is unclear as to the standard by which the District Court declared
the BLM building to be a school.
At the conclusion of the trial, the District Court did not allow Lingnaw to make
closing argument but, rather, simply pronounced his decision. (Tr. pp. 156-161) When
brought to his attention by counsel, the Court stated “I guess I apologize for that”. (Tr. p.
161, Ll. 12-13.)
Although counsel for Lingnaw could not find any case law directly on point,
Lingnaw asserts that the constitutional guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel
includes the right to have counsel present proper argument. State v. Gilbert, 65 Idaho 210,
142 P.2d 584 (1943). This includes the right to liberal freedom of speech and discussion,
and the right to argue the law insofar as the law is not misstated or inconsistent with the
court's instructions. Id.
The Court reasoned that the gymnasium is a school building utilized by the school
for school functions on a regular basis. (Tr. p. 157, Ll. 17-21) The Court further reasoned
that “under any definition of a school, that gymnasium would be considered a school
building.” (Tr. p. 157, Ll. 21-23) While the Court was issuing its decision, counsel for
Lingnaw interrupted and made it clear that Idaho Code Section 18-8329(d) does not say
“school building” it actually says “on which a school is located”. (Tr. p. 159, Ll. 2-5)
Idaho Code Section 18-8329(d) makes it a misdemeanor for a person who is currently
registered or is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act to:
Reside within five hundred (500) feet of the property on which a school is located,
measured from the nearest point of the exterior wall of the offender’s dwelling
unit to the school’s property line, provided however, that this paragraph (d) shall
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not apply if such person's residence was established prior to July 1, 2006.
Following the interruption, the Court attempted to rephrase his ruling by stating "[s]o I do
find under the statute that the - - the gymnasium, under that interpretation of that
subsection, would be considered a school - - as part of a school, simply detached from the
other buildings where classroom activity may occur. But under the intent of the statute,
the gymnasium would be considered a school." (Tr. p. 159, LL 11-17) Lingnaw asserts
that this reasoning is not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Given that the majority ofLingnaw's argument centers around what we assert to
be erroneous findings of fact, the Statement of Facts set forth above is both Lingnaw's
assertion of a concise Statement of Facts, and also his factual argument to support his
position. And, therefore, Lingnaw incorporates and references same as if fully set forth
herein.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
In addition, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1210, Lingnaw would request that this
Honorable Court award costs to him as he asserts that it is equitable and just given the
circumstances, and award attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. An award
under Idaho Code § 12-121 is appropriate if the Court is left with the abiding belief that
the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.

Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. ofPittsburgh, P.A. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 542, 112 P.3d 825,
830 (2005).
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CONCLUSION
Lingnaw respectfully requests this Honorable Court to set aside the District
Court's findings of fact and conclusions oflaw and resulting Judgment, and declare that
the District Court's findings are clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Lingnaw requests that this matter be remanded to the District Court
consistent with this Honorable Court's directives.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This 12th day of December, 2019.
FULLER LAW OFFICES

/s/ Daniel S. Brown
DANIEL S. BROWN
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF E-FILING AND E-SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the 12th day of December, 2019, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief was e-filed and e-served to the
following:
Office of Prosecuting Attorney
Justin B. Oleson
custerpa@gmail.com

/s/ Ranee M. Marsing
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